Slowly, yet confidently, we have the tenacity to wantonly destroy the earth, and in the process, ourselves. We continue to break apart our bonds of trust, losing what worth we have in our lives. This is a time to not blindly move forward, but to step back and reflect on what we are doing. Nonetheless, if we decide that we are not taking the desirable path, what shall we do? In essence, what must we do to cause the transformation of foundational values held within the dominant culture?
To answer such a question, we must first acknowledge how values are formed. We must understand how data enters the mind and is arranged and reconstructed into a single structure of knowledge. The cognitive anthropologist Bradd Shore gives a convincing theory as to how this occurs in a process he termed as meaning construction. (Shore 1996: 315)
Throughout our lives, we are constantly bombarded with information. Our sensory organs gather this information. It is then dispersed throughout relatively specialized areas of the brain. For instance, visual sensory data travels down the optic chiasm, then into the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN), the gateway to the visual cortex. The data is then transferred from the LGN as optic radiation into the visual cortex. Finally, in many regions of the visual cortex, the data is received. Each region of the cortex deciphers parts of the data for particular reasons, whether for the detection of color, texture, movement, or synesthetic properties.
Every specialized region of the brain has come into being through millions of years of evolution. The neural and neruo-chemical interactions within those regions of the brain exist the way they are as the result of selective pressures put forth in the history of our species. Because, as a species, our brains are similar in design, we receive sensory data in much the same way. For this reason, we process that data in a similar manner. These similarities may cover anything from our abilities to compose lexicons through linguistic syntax, (Pinker 1994: 74) to the creation of culture, or emotional reactions. The physical design of the brain defines a core aspect of our nature as human beings.
The data from sensory modalities eventually converges into one of the long-term memories. Within the memory, data is embedded and arranged in relation to existing information. This process of gathering data, then attaching it to existing information is essential to meaning construction. However, how does the memory reform sensory data into the meaningful thoughts and memories with which we are so familiar?
Recent developments in Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) neural network models may shed some light upon the question. However, even though PDP networks are known to behave like the brain, they leave many unanswered questions by making assumptions beyond the physical limitations of the brain. Nonetheless, they are a promising development to unlocking cognition?s nature.
In PDP networks, each unit within the network, comparable to a small grouping of neurons, works in parallel to complete complicated tasks. In basic Backprop PDP networks, three layers work together to “learn” from feedback in how the network deciphers sensory data to create a meaningful response. The network is composed of an input layer (lower), an output layer (upper) and a hidden layer essential to composition of an output. “Synaptic weights” of the units act as a set of patterns, or rules governing new data entering the network. These patterns define how sensory data is deciphered and used in creating a response.
Francis Crick described the process as follows:
Each unit in the upper layer is told (after the network has produced its output to a training input) how that output differs from the ?correct? output. It uses this information to make small adjustments to the weights of the synapses made onto it from each of the units in the layer below. It then back-propagates this information to each of the units in the hidden layer. Each hidden unit then collects this error information sent to it by all the upper layer units, and uses this information to adjust all the synapses coming into it from the lowest layer. [Crick 1994: 190]
Patterns defined through the synaptic weights of each unit in the Backprop PDP network closely resemble patterns of cognitive schemata, the frameworks upon which values are built, and information is dispersed in the mind. Imagine a schema as a sort of filter. Sensory data flows through a particular schema and is “filtered.” As data flows through schemata, it is rearranged and redirected, connecting to existing knowledge stored in memory. This information commonly translates into values of particular concepts, or attributes within concepts. As we constantly take in new information, what exists in the memory is constantly being reworked and expanded with the bombardment of this information. Essentially, we learn more about the world and, in this process, continue to develop and refine our perception of the world.
Type I schematization, the mapping of personal experience onto schemata, involves the act of pattern recognition. The Backprop PDP network recognizes patterns through feedback received, and adjusts the patterns of ?synaptic weights? in its hidden layer accordingly. In the same sense, the brain recognizes patterns in environmental feedback, and then adjusts schemata accordingly. For this reason, the compositionality of schemata may be based upon synaptic weights of neurons within the long-term memories.
The construction of schemata, and in turn, the construction of knowledge based from sensory data defines the malleable aspect of our nature as human beings. Moreover, the concrete, core level of human nature constrains this malleable aspect. For this reason, the mind is limited and imperfect. We shall only accomplish that which is within the brain?s physical limitations.
In conclusion, the brain successfully gathers data through the sensory organs, processes the information, then attaches the information to what already exists in long-term memories. This completes the process of meaning construction.
As we interact with each other in a social group, we share the information in our minds. Through this act of sharing, our views of the world are intertwined with those of others. Over time, these views converge into a public perception, constantly being refined by not only the individual, but also by the interactions of individuals in a social group.
I refer to this process as intersubjective schematization, the synchronization of schematization though the interactions of members in a social group. Before individuals begin to interact within their social environment, the mind constructs perceptions and conceptions upon a purely idiosyncratic, or personal, basis. However, as individuals begin to interact within their social environment, they communicate their knowledge of the world through their interactions with others in the social group. The scope of their interactions covers an indirect form of communication concerned with subtle reactions and changes in behavior and a more direct form requiring intent. For this reason, each individual in the group also reflects upon the knowledge communicated by every other individual. Through time, intersubjective verification and a continuing dialogue slowly synchronizes every individual?s ideas with those of others. Everyone begins to agree upon a core set of ideas essential to the society’s function. In addition, synchronization of knowledge allows everyone to better communicate. As this occurs, collective knowledge becomes even more synchronous between each individual in the group.
Underlying the construction of knowledge, of course, lays the cognitive schemata. As the knowledge of each individual in a social group becomes increasingly synchronous with that of every other individual, underlying this process is the synchronization of schematization.
Mentioned earlier was the notion that we have a core, unchanging level of human nature defined through the brain’s physiology. Building upon this notion, if each individual within a social group has very similar core ideas to the function of society, would not their way of thinking be similar? A process called motivation plays an important role in mentality. In pragmatics, certain forces motivate one to interpret a sign as they would. These motivating forces can be empirically based or psychogenically based. (Shore 1996: 199) Emperical motivation is “logical” in how one makes an interpretation based from external constraints. Psychogenic motivation lays out the psychological relationship between the sign and interpreter. Present beliefs, schemata and even our core nature composes the basis of psychogenic motivation. For this reason, a social group with synchronous fundemental ideas about the function of their society may come to interpret new information in much the same way. However, even small differences in beliefs can widely effect the pragmatics of new information. The knowledge held within our minds is vast in its complexity.
Cultural models are symbolic representations an individual uses to interact with the world and their society. They are the models we follow as part of our way of life. Anthropologists have divided cultural models into basic linguistic and nonlinguistic categories. Those categories are then divided further to cover the most elemental aspects of human behavior. Because cultural models overlap multiple aspects of our behavior, the creation of these models concerns all types of schematization, along with the collaboration of long-term memories. Cultural models are highly dependent upon the process of meaning construction, and in turn, the process of intersubjective schematization. As a result, a certain level of homogeny exists in the worldviews of all members of a particular social group. This synchronization of schematization plays an important role in the composition of our worldviews insofar as our capacity for communication allows.
The process of intersubjective schematization is limited by our capacity to communicate. This capacity is further limited by the dispositional nature of the process of communication. Supposing differences exist in ideas, as our ties with others become weaker and weaker, the degree to which they are able to understand our worldview and our way of thinking declines. In contrast, greater social cohesion acts as a catalyst to a higher level of communication within a group. This, in turn, leads to greater intersubjective schematization. This synergistic cycle of intersubjective schematization, social cohesion and communication acts as a primary force in the building and preservation of a social group’s cultural integrity. Even so, these three processes are only a tiny part of a much larger picture concerning the longevity of a culture’s existence.
In the dominant society, we practice an intense form of possessive individualism extruded by the corporate agenda. The pervasiveness of individualistic social models in recent times has been tearing apart our social cohesion at an unprecedented rate. This, in turn, destroys our ability to effectively communicate with each other as a society. Intersubjective schematization is limited to the social group with whom we most closely associate. This creates a greater diversity of cultural models under the direction of the dominant worldview because of the behavior resulting in individualistic social interactions. As society becomes more pluralistic in this diversity, a common safety measure is to “neutralize” the institutions, eventually transforming them into a “one size fits all” status so that they may be acceptable to the majority. However, this greater diversity, while allowing more creativity in the transformation of culture, leads to the inter-disconnection of sociocultural institutions.
This disconnection, in turn, leads to confliction in sociocultural inter-institutional relationships. In this conflict, the institutions’ relationships are thrown out of equilibrium, commonly resulting in the eventual domination of a single institution. For example, the continued focus upon our socioeconomic system is a sign that the dominant culture?s institutions are severely out of balance. (Clark 1989: 324)
Some argue that this is the result of a gradual rise in corporate power, but the potential reasons must not be limited. Nonetheless, as many ecological economists would argue, classical economic valuation systems are replacing our sense of value in every other aspect of culture. Our society’s health is now considered a matter of economic health.
In addition, a certain level of interconnectedness exists between all aspects of culture independent from inter-institutional relationships. For example, as individualism severely degrades social cohesion, allowing a disparity of power and the eventual domination of the socio-economic system, this pattern increases our tendency to be individualistic. Moreover, the dominance of our socioeconomic system has caused every other sociocultural institution to morph into the image of the predominant system. Childcare, for instance, is now treated as another business practice through the advent of day care centers. As the raising of children is being lowered to the level of automobile maintenance, countless social pathologies are beginning to emerge because children lack the level of attention and love once given to them by their parents.
The interconnectedness between the individual and society, culture and communication, and social cohesion and intersubjective schematization establishes our sociocultural system as a very dynamic and organic system.
Many cognitive scientists agree that the mind is very ecological in how new sensory data is introduced. The mind is, in many instances, a plethora of perceptual and conceptual constructs. Therefore, metaphorically speaking, this plethora of constructs may act as the environment to which new information is introduced. As one’s knowledge becomes this environment, would not the interactions of “minds” within a social group form an ecological collective “mind” to which new information is introduced? In many respects, this ecological framework reflects Yuri Lotman’s notion of the semiosphere. The semiosphere essentially defines a system of semiotics, the collective knowledge of society, as an ecological system. This creates an “ecosphere” of knowledge.
Reflecting upon this argument, I believe that culture is a holistically ecological system (and at a deeper level, a chaotic system) in how new information is introduced and in the interconnectedness of its intra-relationships. For this reason, the ecological metaphor is useful when attempting to restructure the values held within culture.
Chet Bowers, a professor of Education at Portland State University, mentioned the concept of root metaphors in a paper he wrote for the Trumpeter Journal of Ecosophy. Bowers explained the root metaphor as follows:
…the root metaphors frame the process of [sic] analogical thinking whereby the old schema of understanding is mapped on to the new situations that pose the existential problem of needing to be both understood and brought under control. [Bowers, 1993]
Bradd Shore also argues that analogical thinking is key to the formation of schemata. (Shore 1996: 356) Schemata lay out the relationships between new knowledge and old. As a schema is mapped into a new situation, we are given a connection to other knowledge that shares the similar patterns of the schema. The root of a particular concept is embedded within the schema, therefore, if acknowledging the relationship between other concepts whose roots also lie in the schema, the concept’s root may be indirectly grounded in another concept - hence, root metaphor. In essence, this gives us the capacity to then think in the form of an analogy.
Foundational schemata act as the framework of a culture’s foundational values. Foundational schemata are the first “filters” through which new data passes. This foundational framework precedes the construction of every other schema. Therefore, on the cultural scale, its presence can be felt within every cultural model and sociocultural institution.
Type III schematization focuses upon the metonymic relationship between a particular metaphor and the general behavior of that metaphoric subject instituted into a foundational schema. (A metonymic relationship is indexical, for instance, establishing the relationship between smoke and a fire.) Under the dominant worldview, we have instituted a foundational schema of modularity. (Shore 1996: 53, 117) Through this foundational schema, the dominant culture perceives the world through a “looking glass” of modularity. Every concept and perception of the world is neatly reificated and categorized. Mary Clark ingeniously calls this a “quantoid,” or quantified worldview. (Clark 1989: 245) This behavior of modularity, a mechanistic behavior, is commonly the metonym of a machine. Because of this, the dominant root metaphor underlying our foundational schema might be considered a machine.
Returning to the example that the imbalance within our sociocultural inter-institutional relationships has arguably caused the rise of, and eventual domination by our socioeconomic system. Might this domination be the determinant in the creation of our foundational schema of modularity? Might the “machine” metaphor, which we use to describe our interaction within society and the world of which we are a part, be a product of this domination? This “modularity” foundational schema and its corresponding “machine” metaphor have had adverse effects not only upon the way we interact with the Earth, but also with each other. Not only, in recent times, are we witnessing a severe dehumanization of society through labels such as “human resource,” but also in our methodology that treats the natural world as if it is another part of the overlying “machine” continually feeding us “natural resources” for the pursuit of further productivity.
Our foundational schema of modularity establishes a very shallow perspective of the world resulting in the antithesis of many important and highly interconnected phenomena. More often than not, through this foundational schema, we disconnect ourselves from the unfolding existence of which we are so intricately a part. Nature, as we see it, becomes an alien phenomena with which we have no relation. The notion of preserving such an “alien phenomena” then becomes a contextually irrational matter. Our propensity of establishing antithesis after antithesis between ourselves and the existence of which we are a part may be considered the primary implication of our modularity foundational schema.
I once wrote a short story laying out the problems posed by our adoption of this mechanistic worldview:
Once upon a time, as our great civilization ruthlessly fought against the winds of life, a keen young inventor named Cognis created a creation to end all suffering. This creation was a conglomeration of nuts, bolts, turning gears and wheels. A name was coined to convey it’s ultimate power - The Machine. The workings were simple: insert a man, woman or child into its cavernous interior slots, and they will live their lives, turning the cranks and pulling the levers. In return, they shall receive full protection from the pervasive winds of life. [Davis 2001]
In the story, I introduced a handful of metaphors relating to the structure of the dominant culture. The A”Machine,” of course, represents the dominant root metaphor correlating to our foundational schema of modularity. The “winds of life” represented the natural forces which take part in the creation and regulation of our global ecosystem’s biotic diversity. The metaphor of focus, the notion of “cavernous interior slots,” represents the way in which we divide ourselves up as the components of this overlying “Machine.” The walls in which we separate ourselves represent liberty, the underlying force of our individualistic interactions. Political theorists commonly apply utilitarian-like formulas to structure society in order to maximize the potential liberty of each individual while attempting to minimize social conflicts. In this, they commonly believe they are doing good service to society.
What is indeed wrong with liberty? Liberty, in the character of the causa sine qua non to possessive individualism, is not “freedom” in the classic sense. Instead of letting us be free to live the lives as we so desire, the dominant culture’s notion of liberty alienates us, destroying in the process social capital, our bonds of trust. Instead of allowing us to be truly free individuals, we are trapped within our “interior slots” of liberty, desperately holding onto it as the last means to a voice within society. We believe that without this liberty, we would be subject to a life of totalitarianism as laid out in George Orwell’s 1984. In the aggregate-like behavior of our society, coupled with the impersonal presence of our sociocultural institutions of political organization, a life without liberty would indeed be much like that described in 1984.
How does one achieve freedom without liberty? The answer may lie within an alternative form of political organization.
Communalism is a French philosophy of political organization. In communalism, communities rule themselves as separate nation/states. The communities then converge into a confederation - a commune of communes, so to speak. A council with representatives from each community play a part within this confederation as the communities work together as this inter-social commune.
With the adoption of communalism, social group sizes are primarily limited to the local community. For this reason, the people neither lose touch with the dynamics of their community or each other. Economies are localized, and power distribution doesn’t spread beyond that of the community. In addition, social cohesion is far greater, and bonds of trust remain intact. As social cohesion of a communalist social group rises, they have the ability to participate in the process of intersubjective schematization. This, in turn, results in homogeny of individual worldviews of community members - thus establishing a greater level of communication between each individual within the community. Individuals will hold similar perceptions of the world, and will follow intimately similar cultural models. Because of this, they will perceive themselves to have freedom and personal freedom, even though the implications of liberty will not be present. In essence, the overlying imperative of such a culture is to bring people together rather than dividing them up between walls of liberty.
However, in adopting communalism, a greater cultural diversity exists within a group as large as the dominant society. Each commune primarily exists autonomously; therefore, while social cohesion is strong within the commune, it has the potential to become quite weak beyond that of the commune itself. One of the effects from this shift might be inter-social conflict rather than intra-social conflict. In many respects, our core nature as human beings prevents us from being wholly non-violent towards one another. To remedy the problem, social ecologists strongly proclaim the notion of the communalist confederation, carrying its reach to the global level. They couple this with the rationalization of each commune. Therefore, if each commune is treated fairly within the confederation, and each commune reacts to problems upon a rational basis, conflict will be minimized. However, even if the idea appears attractive, our ability to follow such a framework, as mentioned before, is limited by our capacity for nonviolence. No absolute solution for violence can exist, but one can try.
Type IV schematization explains the transformation and creation of schemata anew. The type IV schematization of surface level schemata will eventually influence the core, resulting in type IV foundational schematization.
In order to adopt an alternative form of political organization such as communalism, we must be willing to change our way of thinking. In order for our communities to become dynamic social and cultural centers rather than aggregates of households and firms, we must be willing to conceive of ourselves as more than merely individuals. We are social creatures, and in this respect, we are indeed individuals, yet also a part of a dynamic social whole. Therefore, in the adoption of communalism, we may also begin to adopt a far more dialectical mentality. This, in turn, would translate to type IV schematization.
The induction of reformed schemata based from this model will follow dialectical thought. As a society we would work to search out the antitheses established by our present foundational schema, then work to synthesize our perceptions and conceptions to the classic identity statement coupled with notion that every phenomena is a part of an overlying, unfolding existence. As we slowly influence the surface, we will eventually influence the core. As we work to change both our way of life and mentality, we may eventually undergo type IV foundational schematization. Therefore, the adoption of communalism is causally linked to the transformation of our foundational schema.
The transformation of our foundational schema would lay the path for reforming remaining aspects of our worldview. In essence, the human being in its holistic form, and the Earth of which we are a part, takes on a new meaning in expressing this dialectical perspective. Our change in interaction would be the result of a semiotic reformation.
Under type IV foundational schematization, the reformation of our system of semiotics can occur. How we define the Earth and interpret those definitions will change considerably. Our policy towards the Earth defined through reworked cultural models may indeed create a greater respect for the Earth.
However, returning to the idea that culture is ecological in the interconnectedness of its intra-relationships, the adoption of communalism, even if causally linked to the foundational schema, is but a single piece of a much larger sociocultural framework. In the reformation of our institutions of sociopolitical organization, there may come great change. However, an interconnectedness exists between all sociocultural institutions. Therefore, for type IV foundational schematization to occur, every institution must be transformed.
We must now work together as a society in order to extrude the reformation of every aspect of our sociocultural system. We must be united under a single goal providing this holistic perspective. I believe that type IV foundational schematization may shed some light upon what that goal, in actuality, is.
Within the process of meaning construction, sensory data is essentially “filtered” through schemata. This data is then connected to the existing knowledge within one’s mind. As the individual communicates with others, their knowledge becomes a public knowledge. Depending upon closer ties within a social group, worldviews may form in casual synchrony between all members of the particular social group. As knowledge of such a group converges, their collective knowledge becomes, in essence, the ecological intersubjective “mind” to which new information is introduced. Within this process of cultural ecology, a degree of interconnectedness also exists in the inter-institutional relationships of all sociocultural institutions. However, in the dominant worldview, these inter-institutional relationships are in a state of imbalance. Thus, over time, we have come to form a very mechanistic worldview because of the domination of our socioeconomic system in our society resulting in the transformation of our culture’s dominant root metaphor and its correlating foundational schema. Along with this impersonal nature of the socioeconomic system, we have alienated ourselves, trapped within walls of how we have come to define liberty. I propose that with the adoption of communalism coupled with the process of type IV foundational schematization, we may at last achieve freedom without the implications of liberty. As this occurs, I wonder if such schematization may induce us to respect the Earth of which we are a part, slowly translating it into a new policy of Earth interaction. To conclude, type IV foundational schematization should be viewed in the light of a long-term goal as we slowly begin the process of social reformation.
Unconscious.” American Psychologist 49: 709-24.
Published: 7 years, 7 months ago
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